The law concerning the placing of certain properties under the care of the guardian law 139/91 is a law that was passed under extreme circumstances when bicommunal broke out and turned violent a little while before and following the 1974 invasion of Turkey into the island, as many Turkish Cypriot’s were forced to move out of their properties in the southern part of the island to escape retaliation from Greek Cypriots and headed to the northern part which was controlled by the Turkish army, seeking protection therein. Asa result they never came back to the south since then and were not allowed to visit or live in the south for that matter until for more than three decades. Also, a lot of Greek Cypriots fleed their homes in the southern part for simmillar reasons as their Turkish Counterparts to seek safety in the south.

These facts spearheaded into motion the said law which claims to balance out the lng lasting effects that where created by the Turkish invasion, however it seems more than a political move rather than an act ….

It would be quite a shock for anyone to just find out one day that his insurance or employment contract or even partnership agreement for that matter has swiftly changed into a different document or one has been assigned new liabilities or certain rights have been taken away from them by newly imposed terms through post or through acting on them without realizing, since no one really reads a contract every time they are executing it but it is expected that the parties are bound by the existing terms, as valid.
However unfair this situation is the Courts seem to recognize that even after a contract has been signed the parties can vary it by behaving like they agreed to new terms in the contract, even if they did so inadvertently, meaning either of them did not intend to change its contract consciously but it was held that their actions did.

The principle of unjust enrichment has its roots within the law of equity and draws its purpose from the need to restore a party
who delivered a benefit to a physical person or an entity, to its original position where the law would fail to do so. The following are cases
where the principle of unjust enrichment prevented a party from receiving a benefit at the expense of another.

Boone v Eyre

In that case the parties had contracted for the conveyance of a plantation for 500 pounds and an unnuity of 160 pounds. The claimant did not receive
the full amount of the annuinty and sued the defendant. The defendant refused to perfrom because the claimant had failed to perform his part of the contract
by not owning the slaves as it was a condition precedent that he owned the slaves. The Court decided that if he got to keep the arrears on the annuity then
that money was a lot more than what he would have claimed for the value of the illegal slaves and therefore he would get to be unnjustly enriched. The court decided
that because consideration went into part of the contract he should sue instead for the damages he sustained.

In Menalaou v Bank of Cyprus Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1960

In that case the defendants who where indebted to the bank made an agreement with them to release their charges on their house in order to sell it and use
the proceeds of the sale to buy another smaller house as their family home and a deposit for their newlywed daughter’s new home. The purchaseer was found for 1.9 million pounds
but that amount was not enough to settle the bank’s 2.2 million debt towards it. So the bank agreed with them to release their charges on their family home provided that it was going to
that they where going to be granted a new charge on the new new family home and 750.000 pounds off the proceeds of sale where going to be paid against their remaining
debt towards the bank. The house was going to be under their daughters Melissa’s name and she was going to sign it. Once it received the money the bank released its charges
on their house as agreed and they signed the When the couple later on run into financial difficulties the bank sought to sell the house under
their daughter’s name but the latter objected to it claiming it had no rights over it as she ever had signed the charge herself. The first level Court ruled that the daughter had been unjustly enrichment but since the enrichment was not at the bank’s expense because it did not release its charges on the mortgaged property until after the newly bought family home was transferred under Melissa’s name and therefore there was no causation between the bank’s suffering a detriment and the transfer of the benefit to the youngest daughter.

The principle of Unjust enrichment is a well grounded principle of the law of restitution. It’s foundations are deeply rooted
in the law of equity since it provides a person with a rememdy in several situations when there is no contractual framework or when the contractual purpose has totally failled.
Since unjust enrichment may be claimed outside a contractual setting it operates on strict guidelines to prevent it from being abused and creating
an unfair situation whereby certain property is claimed from someone else. Hence, in the case of Orakpo v. Manson Investments [1977] 3 All E.R. it was stated that
“Τhere is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. What it does is to provide specific remedies in particular cases of what might be classified as unjust enrichment
in a legal system that is based on the civil law.”

In the case of Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1960 (02 July 2013) it was quoted from Goff & Jones The Law of Unjust Enrichment (8th Edition) at 6-01, that ” the term “at the claimant’s expense”
“signifies that the claimant must have suffered a loss that was sufficiently closely linked to the defendant’s gain for the law to hold that there was a transfer of value between the parties. This rule reflects the principle that the law of unjust enrichment is not concerned with the disgorgement of gains made by defendants,
nor with the compensation of losses sustained by claimants, but with the reversal of transfers of value between claimants and defendants.”

Unjust enrichment occurs in many different cases and its application is designed to bring about justice.

In the case of Theocharides Nakis and others v. Ioanni Ioannou and others (2012) 1 SCJ 1311 reference was  made to the case English case of Banque Financiere de la Cite v. Parc (Battessea) Ltd [1998] 1 All E.R. 737 which set certain bright – lines that are to be followed through, for someone to launch a successful claim in unjust enrichment and regard ought to be had to the following questions: (i) Has the defendant benefited or been enriched? (ii) Was the enrichment at the expense of the defendant? (iii) Was the enrichment unjust? (iv) Are there any defences?

Mistake is a very broad subject in contract law and an also an important one as it is used as a legal reason to avoid a contract.

However because the term mistake may be used to describe a wide number of reasons for entering a contract in order for someone to claim it successfully there are certain conditions that need to be fulfilled or else there is a risk of breeding uncertainty into everyday commerce and undermining the foundations of legally binding agreements simply by defining a number of circumstances as mistake and claiming their termination.

As much as uncertainty remains an issue as to the aplication of the mistake as a factor of vitiating a contract, this is reflected in various decisions taken by courts where different outcomes may reached based on simillar fact and thus regard must be had to the conditions that ought to be satisfied before it is claimed as a ground for contract cancellation by someone.

Fortunately the courts have laid out certain criteria that need to be satisfied in order to claim mistske successfully. In the famous case of the House of Lords …….the court required that mistake must fulfill the below criteria: 

Entering a Contract by mistake.                                                                          

There are many ways to enter into a contract and mistake is one of them. A mistake is a legitimate reason why a contract should be cancelled or as stated in legalese be void ab initio of the mistake is considered a vitiating factor. Of course you can understand that if that was the case every so often contracts would be cancelled on the basis of mistake for a minor reason just so someone can evade his responsibilities under a contract or escape a bad bargain. This would entirely uproot the purposes of contract law to serve as a pillar of certainty in commercial transactions. Also a mistake  in that sense would run counter to the principles of making a contract which since why would one party have a contract cancelled if he was not mistaken ? who would compensate him if he made expenses relying on the other party’s mistake and whatever would happen to the contractual element if intention to create legal relationship? Why would he have to suffer the bane of the other’s mistake?

Well the common law an ever evolving organism and always finding the solution to its self – made queries has struck a fair balance in a situation where mistake has taken place before the formation of a contract.

1.  concerned a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law, but nevertheless constitutes the starting point for any analysis as to when a contract may be set aside on grounds of common mistake.^[20] Five elements must be satisfied:^[21]

(1) There must be a common assumption as to the existence of a state of affairs.

(2) There must be no warranty by either party that that state of affairs exists.

(3) The non-existence of the state of affairs must not be attributable to the fault of either party.

(4) The non-existence of the state of affairs must render performance of the contract impossible.

(5) The state of affairs may be the existence, or a vital attribute, of the consideration to be provided or circumstances which must subsist if performance of the contractual venture is to be possible.

However a mistake may be come in the form of a unilateral mistake but this is not a classic type of mistake and much more of a misnomer as in essence it is a misrepresentation which was caused by the other party’s taking advantage of something which would not have been a misrepresentation had there being no double meaning regarding the description of the subject matter and he knew the other party was mistaken to so it would fall short of misrepresentation but was morally not,

A month to month lease when there is no written contract by default runs from one to month until it is stopped. Leases are contracts that provide the person who pays a rent with the right to live on someone else’s land. They can be oral as well as recorded in writing.

In today’s ever increasing litigious society where people are looking for a roof over their heads but do not want to bind themselves to a lengthy rental agreement, an oral lease can provide much needed flexibility to both sides.

However as much as elasticity there is to an oral lease there are certain risks involved in it.

Assuming that the rent is renewed on a monthly basis, then it will be renew every single month automatically unless terminated. So the parties to the lease have to make sure they terminate the rental legally accurately to avoid having to pay for the coming months.

Additionally the notice must be given in the right form if it will effect termination or otherwhise it won’t have such effect. This includes the way it is written and the notice period given must correspond to that required by law.

Betweent the years 2012 amd 2013 one onf the biggest security scandals came to light when the two major banks of Cyprus anounced they would be suspending the
interest payments upon certain secutities they had sold to the public at large. That made the pubic suspicious about the real nature of these securities sold to them so
they turned to the regulatory authorities to investigate the matter further. The Cyprus Stock Exchange Commision and the the Central Bank of Cyprus opened u
an investigation into the bank’s affairs they issued a daming report documenting their findings. They found that in relation to the launching
if these securities breached not only had misrepresented their nature and breached a number of positive duties under the eMarkets in Financial Instruments Directive
(2004/39/EC) passed by the Eurpean legislative authors. The misrepresentations where that the investors where investing their lifesavings into five year fixed term
deposits htat they offered a yield from anywhere between the range of a whopping 7.5% interest rate to 5.5% depending on the kind of the deposit. That
this was going to be fixed for the first year and then they would be offering the normal euribor rate plus a certain spread sometimes they told them the
interest rate was going to remain the same throughout the five years), that they could take out a loan to invest in these securities and that they would
not be liable to pay back the loan or either its interest. They also misrepresented these loans as being part of the securities investment plan and
that when the principal sums would be returned they would the loan would be settled automatically . To that effect they where interest only loans to serve the purpose
of being paid automatically by the interest generated by the securities. Based on that arrangement, they could borrow to have access to their principal sum
knowing in their mind that they would not be accountable for these loans or depending on the case make a profit upon the difference between the interest rate
paid on the bonds the lower interest of the loan. They could even sell them on the stock exhange and profit from their rise in their price.
They also mistated to them that the primary reason the bank was giving such high yields
was that they decided to venture out and boost their profits and everyone would benefit.

These were all misrepresentations as theses securities where far from deposits. They where hybrid securities belonging to either first tier or second tier
capital meaning that if the bank was not performing well financially they could either suspend payment under these contract if they saw that the bank
was insolvent or going to be insolvent as a result of making such payments. As to the Bank of Cyprus securities that where issued in 2008 they belonged
to second tier capital and had a maturity date of ten years as opposed to being misrepresented as being for five years The 2009 and beyond series had no maturity date OR because they were considered perpetuitues. Since these
instruments belonged to the bank’s first tier and second tier capital their sole objective was to prevent the bank from ever becoming insolvent and continue to
pay its real depositors and all its other expenses that where included in senior debt. In case the bank faced liquidity problems then
it would resort to these very funds in order to continue to pay its obligations. First and second tier capital also hinged on the priority
of these investors in case the bank decided to liquidate its assets. Since first and second tier capital (less reliable form of capital and requires high threshold of losses for it to stop paying)
include hybrid securities and equity) these where unsecured subordinated debt, meaning the bank’s assets where not secured or pledged as collateral for the liabilities of such investors in their capacity as lender’s of the bank. The second tier capital securities were also considered as “senior unsecured debt” meaning
that they enjoyed a lower priority than senior debt but higher priority than other forms of subordinated debt. With first tier capital the bank did not even have to be insolvent to stop making payments.

CAN A PRINCIPAL BE LIABLE FOR FRAUD FOR THE MISREPRESENTATION OF HIS AGENT WHEN HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE FALSITY OF THE REPRESENTATION?.

It has been widely recognized in English law that you cannot establish the mens rea for fraud by putting together to innocent states of mind. There is some authority starting with the case of Cornfoot v Fowke which states that when an innocent agent who lacks the necessary dishonesty makes a misrepresentation to a third party and the principal know that this statement is false there won’t be a finding of fraud on the part of the principal. The reasoning behind this is that the agent was innocent in making the misrepresentation and the principal had not authorized it or did not know that the statement was being made since in such case there was nothing the principal could do to prevent the agent from making that statement. ( See Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M.& W. 358) This principal was reiterated in the case of Armstrong v . Strain, 1952. In other words we have no wrongful act being made eg. the misrepresentation was made innocently and at the time of the making of that act a state of mind with knowledge of the said act which could be prevented or stopped by the principal or another agent is actually missing. This knowledge may be proved through authorization or under the circumstances knowledge that the statement was being made. In that sense a second agent or the principal fraudulently allows the misrepresentation to be made or he just stood by it. This is an extract from the case of Cornfoot v Fowke which demonstrates the difficulties concerning such a case ” [Parke, B. The difficulty here is, that under this plea you are to make out fraud in the plaintiff or his agent; but it is not shewn that the agent knew of the existence of this objection to the house and the plaintiff did not know and the plaintiff did not make the representation or know of its having been made If you could make out that the plaintiff knew that Clarke was ignorant of it, and had employed him on purpose that he might make that answer, then it might have been a fraud in the plaintiff . At first it may seem unjust not to find fraud in a principal who has not disclosed a material fact to his agent as it seems that he can escape fraud with impunity but this seeming injustice is masterfully explained by ROLFE B in Cornfoot v Fowke in paragraph 370 of the judgment by reference to the case of Pickering v. Dawson, 4 Taunt 779 where he states that since all the facts were consistent with the hypothesis that the plaintiff innocently gave no directions whatever on the subject, supposing that the intended tenant would make the necessary inquiries for himself, or even with the stronger supposition that he expressly desired Clarke not to make any representations at all on the subject. If the plaintiff knowing of the nuisance expressly authorized Clarke to state that it did not exist , or to make any statement of similar import or if he purposely employed an agent ignorant of the truth in order that such agent might innocently make a false statement believing it to be true and might so deceive the party to whom he was dealing; in either of this cases he would be guilty of fraud”. Therefore considering the above scenario if the principal had authorized the statement or information of similar import or had even known that the agent was making the false statement to the third party and he possessed the required fraudulent mind or even if a second agent or principal stood by while knowing that the false representation was being made and that it was false then again the principal or company will be liable in fraud. ( knowledge of the falsity or recklessness combined with a dishonest state of mind) ( see London County Freehold v Berkeley Property Co Ltd [1936] 2 All E.R. 1039). Moreover if the principal has authorized, procured, approved or encouraged the making of a false representation by the agent who was unaware it was false the principal’s guilty knowledge will be sufficient to attract liability in deceit. All these acts show knowledge that a misrepresentastion is being made and when he had knowledge of the misrepresentation or he was reckless as to its truth then the principal will be liable for fraud. DOES THE SAME APPLY TO NON DISCLOSURE? Let’s suppose that the principal has not authorized a certain statement or encouraged it but he deliberately concealed facts from the agent intending the representee to be misled. In this case he will be equally liable for fraud or if he was reckless as to whether he may be misled. ( see para18-23, chapter 18-deceit, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts and also para 18-28 – Representation must be intended to be acted on by the claimant ” It seems that intent, for these purposes, includes not only the case where the defendant actually desires the claimant to rely in what he says, but also where he appreciates that in the absence of some unforseen intervention he will actually do so”. More importantly, the same applies to non disclosure by a principal to the agent of certain facts rather than authorizing a positive representation. THE REVERSE IS ALSO POSSIBLE. So the same principles will apply when the principal makes a represenation and the agent knows the statement to be true and does not intervene to correct it while the principal makes the represenation innocently.

A of 8/3/15 the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, Section 2SHPO have amended the Sexual Offences Act 2003 by bringing into operation SHPO’s (Sexual Harm Prevention Orders) and repealing their predecessors called SOPO’s to the extent that they applied to England and Wales as SOPO’S still remain in force in Scotland and Northern Ireland. SHPO’s orders are aiming at stopping sexually offending conduct which may arise in in the future from persons who are considered high risk offenders. Since sexually related offenses have been linked with a likelihood of recidivism, such orders aim at preventing further sexual harm, including psychological harm, though these come at a huge costs on the persons they are imposed on as they may strongly interfere with their right to respect for private and family life of the European Convention of Human Rights and thus are have been criticized for that.

SHPO are issued in two circumstances:

The first is when a Court the court deals with a person who has been found guilty of an offence (i) an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5, or (ii) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5 by reason of insanity, or (iii)a finding that the defendant is under a disability and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5 and the Court decides that there is a necessity to make such an order (i) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or (ii)protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom. The Act and several case law stress the only prohibitions that may be included in a sexual harm prevention order are those necessary for the protection of the above person or class of persons.

The second way such an order is issued is upon an application by a chief officer of police or the Director General of the National Crime Agency to a magistrate’s court when the person concerned is a qualifying offender has since the appropriate date acted ins such a way as to give reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary for such an order to be made.

Under the definition of “qualifying offender” includes a person who was cautioned of a relevant offence listed or referred to in the Act thus reflecting its seriousness in preventing future sexual crimes.

Such orders run for a minimum 5 year period or even indefinitely (with the exception of travel bans being a 5 year maximum period) and prohibit the defendant from doing anything described in the order. Since their coming into operation SHPO have been protecting the public or members of the public from sexual harm as opposed to serious harm which their predecessors SOPOS (Sexual Offences Prevention Orders). SHPO are in force in England and Wales whereas In Scotland and Ireland still use SOPOS. Another change worth mentioning in SHPO is that a child is a person under the age of 18 while under SOPO’s it was under 16.

The civil procedure is used for the imposition of these orders as much as it was used for SOPO’s, with the exception that the standard of proof being the criminal one, beyond reasonable doubt. The demand for this high standard of proof is owing to the fact that these orders are not typical restraining orders unlike typical restraining order, are much more oppressive as it has often been critised as constituting punishment, when in fact the person in question has already been convicted of the offense in relation to which they apply on them or never been found guilty and yet finding themselves socially isolated and sidelined by society through these orders as their breach carries up to a maximum 5 year prison sentence. Their proponents argue for them as being successful means in controlling the occurrence of future sexual crime, in a more than never before, failing criminal justice system.